| Hanwha SNH-V6410PN (SNH-V6410PN)
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Security Grade
Calculator v1
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Hanwha SNH-V6410PN (SNH-V6410PN)
Category: Camera • Model / Gen: SNH-V6410PN
Release Date: 2016-01-01 • Status: End of life
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Security Evaluation
1. Device Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Known hardware tampering
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None
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—
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No published hardware-tampering research for this camera was found as of 2026-10. The unit is a sealed indoor PT camera with no external service port.
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| Known vulnerabilities
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Very common
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[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6298
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6299
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6295
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6294 🔗 Proof]
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Ten CVEs list snh-v6410pn directly in their CPE configurations, all published in 2018 from the same audit of Hanwha Techwin Smartcams. CVE-2018-6298 (CVSS 10.0) is remote code execution. CVE-2018-6299 (7.5) is authentication bypass, CVE-2018-6297 (7.5) a buffer overflow, CVE-2018-6295 (7.5) unencrypted remote control and communications, and CVE-2018-6294 (7.5) an unsecured firmware update path. CVE-2018-6296, 6300, 6301, 6302 and 6303 add a hidden web-interface switch, remote password change, arbitrary cloud camera access and two denial-of-service paths.
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| Prior attacks
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Rare
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No recorded attack naming this model was found. The CVEs date from 2018 and the product is end of life, so any exploitation would have been historical, and no campaign was located, so the value is kept at Rare rather than asserting in-the-wild use. Provisional value.
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| Updatability
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None
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🔗 Proof
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The SNH-V6410PN is end of life and receives no further firmware. The 2018 flaws, including the CVSS 10.0 remote code execution, cannot be fixed by any update; the only mitigation is to remove the camera from the network or retire it.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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2. System Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Authentication with other systems
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No
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🔗 Proof
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CVE-2018-6299 is an authentication bypass, so a connecting party is not required to prove who it is; combined with the cloud access flaw in CVE-2018-6301, no meaningful authentication stands between the camera and other systems.
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| Communications
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No encryption
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🔗 Proof
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CVE-2018-6295 documents an unencrypted way of remote control and communications, so traffic can be read and altered on the path.
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| Storage
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No encryption
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No at-rest encryption is documented for stored configuration or recordings on this model. Provisional value, not directly evidenced.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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3. User Authentication
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Account management
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Basic
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A fixed account model managed through the app with no granular roles. Provisional value, not directly evidenced for this model.
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| Authentication
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Absent
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🔗 Proof
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Login exists, but CVE-2018-6299 shows authentication can be bypassed outright, and CVE-2018-6300 allows a remote password change, so the authentication control does not hold.
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| Brute-force protection
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Absent
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—
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No documented lockout or rate limiting, and brute force is moot given the bypass in CVE-2018-6299. Provisional value.
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| Event logging
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Partial logging
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A partial local log exists in the app and web interface, with no centralised or tamper-evident record. Provisional value, not directly evidenced for this model.
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| Passwords
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Default/Common/Easy to guess
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🔗 Proof
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CVE-2018-6300 allows a remote password change, which implies the password is not protected by the setup flow, and the camera line predates the modern requirement to force a unique password on activation.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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Technical Specifications
| Property
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Details
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| Operating System & App
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Embedded Linux (Companion App: )
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| Hardware (CPU / GPU)
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CPU: • GPU:
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| Memory & Storage
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Memory: • Storage:
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| Power, Battery & Charging
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Battery: • Power: • Charging:
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| Display & Camera
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Display: • Camera:
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| Sound & Connectivity
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Sound: • Connectivity: Wi-Fi, Ethernet (RJ45)
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| Physical (Dimensions & Mass)
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Dimensions: • Mass:
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The Hanwha Techwin SNH-V6410PN is an indoor PT Wi-Fi camera from the Smartcam line, now end of life. Its vulnerability record is the most damning of any device in this set: ten CVEs list snh-v6410pn directly in their CPE configurations, all from a single 2018 audit. CVE-2018-6298 scores CVSS 10.0 for remote code execution, and the rest of the set is barely less severe: authentication bypass (CVE-2018-6299), buffer overflow (CVE-2018-6297), unencrypted remote control and communications (CVE-2018-6295), unsecured firmware update (CVE-2018-6294), a hidden web-interface switch (CVE-2018-6296), remote password change (CVE-2018-6300), arbitrary cloud camera access (CVE-2018-6301) and two denial-of-service paths. Read together they describe a product where every layer failed at once rather than a single coding slip. The decisive fact is that the camera is end of life and receives no firmware, so none of this can be patched, only mitigated by removing the device from the network. The device is rated F, and the arithmetic is stated: Device sums to 1+3+2+3 = 9, averaging 2.25 which rounds up to 3, with the updatability score of 3 reflecting that no update path exists; System sums to 3+3+3 = 9, averaging 3; User Authentication sums to 2+3+3+2+3 = 13, averaging 2.6 which rounds up to 3, giving a GRAS of 9. One value is deliberately conservative: device_prior_attacks is scored Rare because no specific exploitation campaign was located, even though an unauthenticated CVSS 10.0 RCE on an unmaintained internet-connected camera is precisely the profile that gets conscripted into botnets. Values for hardware tampering, storage encryption, account management, brute-force protection and event logging are provisional because no model-level Hanwha documentation could be retrieved.
