| Arduino Nano RP2040 Connect (ABX00053)
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Security Grade
Calculator v1
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Arduino Nano RP2040 Connect (ABX00053)
Release Date: 2021-05-17 • Status:
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Security Evaluation
1. Device Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Known hardware tampering
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Rare
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🔗 Proof
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P: Physical programming exposure is documented; malicious tampering frequency is unknown. Rare is a provisional midpoint, not a measured incident rate.
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| Known vulnerabilities
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Rare
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🔗 Proof
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I: Unauthenticated HTTP is a weakness of this reference application. Rare is a qualitative provisional mapping, not a model-specific CVE count.
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| Prior attacks
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Rare
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🔗 Proof
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P: Historical attack frequency is unknown. The linked design source is not an incident census; 2 is only an illustrative midpoint.
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| Updatability
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Very common
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🔗 Proof
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I: Manual reprogramming is documented. The low update-risk point reflects that capability, not automatic patching or a guaranteed support lifetime.
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| Category Score
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Score: 2 / 3
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2. System Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Authentication with other systems
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No
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🔗 Proof
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C: No application peer authentication.
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| Communications
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No encryption
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🔗 Proof
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C: HTTP lacks end-to-end TLS; Wi-Fi protection is separate.
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| Storage
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No encryption
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🔗 Proof
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C: Selected scenario leaves application storage unencrypted. This is a deployment assumption, not absence of silicon cryptography.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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3. User Authentication
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Account management
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Absent
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🔗 Proof
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C: No application accounts.
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| Authentication
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Absent
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🔗 Proof
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C: No HTTP login check.
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| Brute-force protection
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Absent
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🔗 Proof
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C: No application authentication gate or login throttling.
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| Event logging
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Partial logging
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🔗 Proof
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I: Console request diagnostics; no complete access audit.
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| Passwords
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Default/Common/Easy to guess
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🔗 Proof
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I: No application password; closest weakest option. Not a claim about the Wi-Fi key.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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Technical Specifications
| Property
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Details
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| Operating System & App
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WiFiNINA WiFiWebServer source snapshot reviewed 2026-10-24; main/radio firmware and core versions not observed (Companion App: )
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| Hardware (CPU / GPU)
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CPU: RP2040 with u-blox NINA-W102 Wi-Fi module • GPU:
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| Memory & Storage
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Memory: • Storage: 16 MB external flash; no application storage encryption assumed
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| Power, Battery & Charging
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Battery: • Power: • Charging:
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| Display & Camera
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Display: • Camera:
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| Sound & Connectivity
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Sound: • Connectivity: Wi-Fi; HTTP reference application; USB programming
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| Physical (Dimensions & Mass)
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Dimensions: • Mass:
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Assessment scope — 2026-10-24: application-specific, provisional. Source-review scenario using the Arduino WiFiNINA WiFiWebServer analog-input HTTP example. Main/radio firmware maintenance and compilation were not verified. Arduino Cloud and its protections are excluded.
Software scope: WiFiNINA WiFiWebServer source snapshot reviewed 2026-10-24; main/radio firmware and core versions not observed. No physical device, installed firmware, production revision or working build was inspected. Example sources are reviewed as retrieved on the assessment date; they are not immutable version pins.
Conditions: configured Wi-Fi access; a client can reach the HTTP endpoint; no added reverse proxy, application authentication, storage encryption or cloud service. These are explicit paper-assessment conditions, not claims about factory defaults or every possible deployment.
Rubric limitations: E=documented, I=interpretation, C=conditional, P=provisional. D1 and D3 incident rates remain unknown; the chosen Rare labels are midpoint scenarios, not verified frequency findings. D2 maps a reference-program weakness, not a hardware CVE. U5 maps no application password to the weakest available option.
Calculation: ceil((2+2+2+1)/4)+ceil((3+3+3)/3)+ceil((3+3+3+2+3)/5)=2+3+3=8 (D, provisional). Allowing D1/D2/D3 to vary over 1–3 yields 7–9 (C–F), keeping the stated application assumptions. No unconditional product grade is established.
Release date: 2021-05-17. Official launch article states launch stock was sent to reseller partners and directs readers to purchase immediately. Official availability announcement.
Model-specific boundary: ABX00053 is identified on the manufacturer datasheet. Its ATECC608A secure element and radio encryption capabilities are not proof that this demonstration sketch encrypts its ordinary application data. Manufacturer model record.
Practical improvement: add authenticated TLS access, protect secrets and physical access, and maintain the selected firmware. Reassess after any change. Reference source.
