Apple iPhone 3G
From Wiki-IoT
Classification
| Apple iPhone 3G | |
|---|---|
| Classification | |
| Grade | D |
| Calculator version | 1 |
| Classification date | 2025-10-15 |
| Information | |
| Name | iPhone 3G |
| Brand by Parent | Apple by Apple Inc. |
| Generation | 2nd |
| Model(s) | A1324, A1241 |
| Release date | 2008-06-09 |
| Type/Category | Smartphone |
| Website | [1] |
| Status | End of life |
| More | |
| Dimensions | 115.5 mm × 62.1 mm × 12.3 mm |
| Mass | 133 g |
| Operating system | iPhone OS 2.0 (upgradable to iOS 4.2.1) |
| Companion App | iTunes (for sync and activation) |
| CPU | ARM11, 412 MHz (underclocked to 400 MHz) |
| GPU | PowerVR MBX Lite 3D GPU |
| Memory | 128 MB eDRAM |
| Storage | 8 GB / 16 GB (internal flash storage) |
| Battery | Internal rechargeable lithium-ion battery 1150 mAh |
| Power | |
| Charging | Via 30-pin Dock Connector |
| Display | 3.5-inch (diagonal) TFT LCD Multi-touch touchscreen 320 x 480 pixel resolution at 163 ppi |
| Camera | Rear: 2.0 MP Video recording: No (still photos only) |
| Sound | Single loudspeaker 3.5mm headphone jack |
| Connectivity | Wireless: GSM, EDGE, Wi-Fi (802.11b/g), Bluetooth 2.0 + EDR Location: Assisted GPS (A-GPS) |
| Device | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Criterion | Value | Proof(s) | Comment |
| Known hardware tampering | Rare | [2] | Hardware tampering was not common from the supply chain, but "jailbreaking" by users to bypass restrictions was very widespread. This is a form of post-purchase software/OS tampering. |
| Known vulnerabilities | Very common | [3] | As an early smartphone, the iPhone 3G and its iOS versions (primarily 3.x-4.x) accumulated many discovered vulnerabilities over time, especially after newer models were released. |
| Prior attacks | Very common | [4] | Well-publicized attacks like the "ikee" worm (2009) and the SMS vulnerability demonstrated that the device was a active target for exploits. |
| Updatability | Rare | [5] | The iPhone 3G's last major OS update was iOS 4.2.1 (2010), which it performed poorly on. It did not receive updates for long, leaving it vulnerable to later discovered threats. |
| Category score | 3 | ||
| System | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Criterion | Value | Proof(s) | Comment |
| Authentication with other systems | Partial | [6] | Supported integration with services like MobileMe (Apple ID) and Exchange for email/calendar, but modern OAuth-based integrations did not exist. |
| Communications | Encrypted with obselete encryption | [7] | Supported SSL 3.0 and early TLS versions (e.g., TLS 1.0), which are now considered obsolete and insecure. Wi-Fi encryption (WPA/WPA2) was supported. |
| Storage | Encrypted with obselete encryption | [8] | Full device encryption was introduced in iOS 4 for the iPhone 3G, but it used a weaker, hardware-based encryption system compared to modern iPhones. The passcode did not strengthen the encryption key. |
| Category score | 2 | ||
| User Authentication | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Criterion | Value | Proof(s) | Comment |
| Account management | Basic | [9] | Device had a single user account. Management was limited to setting a passcode and configuring basic mail/App Store accounts. |
| Authentication | Basic | [10] | Offered a simple 4-digit numeric passcode. Complex alphanumeric passwords were an option but not the default or common. No biometrics (Touch ID/Face ID). |
| Brute-force protection | Basic | [11] | After multiple failed passcode attempts, the device would impose increasing time delays before another attempt could be made. |
| Event logging | Partial logging | [12] | Limited system and diagnostic logs were available, primarily for developers and enterprise. Not a comprehensive security event log accessible to the user. |
| Passwords | Default/Common/Easy to guess | [13] | The default state was no passcode. When set, the default was a simple 4-digit number. The device did not force a change after initial setup or enforce complexity. |
| Category score | 3 | ||
| Grade | D |
|---|
