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| D-Link DIR-815
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Security Grade
Calculator v
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Wireless N Dual Band Router (DIR-815)
Category: Router • Model / Gen: DIR-815 A1
Release Date: 2010-10-18 • Status: End of life
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Security Evaluation
1. Device Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Known hardware tampering
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Rare
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π Proof
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Qualitative physical-access judgment: exact A1 board JP1 TX/RX, serial boot menu writes firmware/bootloader via TFTP/serial. Not measured tampering incidence or reset alone.
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| Known vulnerabilities
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Very common
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[1] π Proof
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Qualitative multiple historical flaws, not statistics: A1v1.01 shared telnet secret, tested UPnP injection, vendor hedwig/service.cgi issues. Each advisory has its own version scope.
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| Prior attacks
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Rare
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[2] π Proof
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Qualitative: actual controlled A1v1.00 root/reboot exploitation(2013); Unit42 observed2019 Mirai sample DIR815 targeting capability. Not exact victim infection, population or Dyn attribution.
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| Updatability
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None
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π Proof
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Current OEM maintenance: vendor all revisions EOL/EOS2017-12-29, no ongoing development. None is maintenance cadence, not technical inability to flash old firmware or third-party support.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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2. System Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Authentication with other systems
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Partial
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[3] π Proof
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Mixed capability: WPA/WPA2 PSK/EAP and RADIUS shared secret; tested unauthenticated local UPnP commands. Partial, not mandatory mutual authentication for all services.
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| Communications
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No encryption
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π Proof
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Historical local HTTP management only: model-tested Metasploit login module sends login_plaintext/PASSWD via HTTP. Not all traffic; WPA2/AES available on separate wireless link.
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| Storage
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No encryption
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[4] π Proof
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Sensitive system secret only: A1v1.01 report recovers literal working telnet secret from flash-backed rootfs image_sign; A1 board boot shows NOR/SquashFS. Not every flash/user-data item.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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3. User Authentication
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Account management
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Basic
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π Proof
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A1 manualp71: fixed administrator password controls. Basic, not arbitrary account creation/deletion or flexible roles; no device test.
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| Authentication
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Basic
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[5] π Proof
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Normal administrator web login exists; A1v1.01 paper shows shared hardcoded telnet login yielding shell. Basic weak/mixed authentication, not absence of login.
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| Brute-force protection
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Basic
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π Proof
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A1 manualp71 optional distorted-letter/number graphical login challenge. Basic capability, not default enabled, comprehensive lockout or rate limiting.
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| Event logging
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Partial logging
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π Proof
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A1 manualp80: System/Firewall&Security/RouterStatus logs, severity, export/syslog. Partial; comprehensive success/failure administrator-login auditing not established.
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| Passwords
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Default/Common/Easy to guess
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π Proof
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A1 manual: administrator password blank by default and change controls. Setup password advice is not mandatory later change; A1v1.01 also has shared hardcoded telnet credential.
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| Category Score
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Score: 3 / 3
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Technical Specifications
| Property
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Details
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| Operating System & App
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Historical OEM A1: testedv1.00; shared-secretv1.01; current maintenance EOL (Companion App: )
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| Hardware (CPU / GPU)
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CPU: • GPU:
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| Memory & Storage
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Memory: • Storage:
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| Power, Battery & Charging
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Battery: • Power: • Charging:
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| Display & Camera
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Display: • Camera:
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| Sound & Connectivity
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Sound: • Connectivity:
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| Physical (Dimensions & Mass)
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Dimensions: • Mass:
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Documentary assessment, NOT device testing/current certification. Original DIR815A1 only, not AC/R4/S1/B1. Snapshots: testedv1.00, secretv1.01, present maintenanceEOL. Rare/Very common qualitative assessor judgments, not measured frequency. HTTP management and flash-backed sensitive system secret ONLY, not all traffic/all user data; optional WPA2 exists. Graphical login protection is optional capability, not default. Actual controlled root exploitation is distinct from observed malware targeting capability; no proven exact victim infection count or Dyn participation. Date2010-10-18 is ANZ regional introduction/available-now, not global first launch or first shipment. Vendor-authored announcement mirrored at https://manuals.plus/m/98a08550d9b4a86bca21b32f2e6e73a9df387d4cad70c5ebb1c76c3aad618f5e.pdf; vendor-hosted original unrecovered, announcement does not explicitly name hardware revision. Manual cover identifies originalA1.