Insteon Hub 2245-222 (Firmware 1012)

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Insteon Hub 2245-222 (Firmware 1012)
Security Grade
   
     D
   
Calculator v1
Insteon Hub 2245-222 (Firmware 1012)
   Category: Smart Home Hub / Gateway • Model / Gen:  2245-222 (Hub 2), assessed on firmware 1012
   Release Date: 2015-05-01 • Status: EOL
   Classification Date: 2026-10-23 • [support.insteon.com/support-knowledgebase/insteon-hub2-release-notes Official Website]

Security Evaluation

1. Device Security

Criterion Value Proof Comment
Known hardware tampering None [talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0496 πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; the cited Talos advisories describe software/PubNub vulnerabilities and do not document a known, published hardware-tampering (teardown/jtag/debug-pad) exposure for this hub, so None is assigned on the cited firmware 1012/1013 evidence only.
Known vulnerabilities Very common [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-14447 πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; Cisco Talos disclosed twelve+ vulnerabilities on firmware 1012 (stack/global buffer overflows leading to RCE, information leak, DoS; CVE-2017-14447 and CVE ranges CVE-2017-16252 through CVE-2017-16347), plus Rapid7 CVE-2017-5251 for unencrypted hub-to-device radio; assessment limited to firmware 1012/1013 as tested by Talos.
Prior attacks Rare [blog.talosintelligence.com/multiple-vuln-insteon/ πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; public proof-of-concept code and technical disclosures exist (Talos PoC curl request, Rapid7 writeup), but no documented mass in-the-wild compromise campaign was found, so Rare rather than Very common.
Updatability Rare [www.reviewgeek.com/115308/insteon-may-have-joined-the-list-of-failed-smart-home-companies/ πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; the original vendor shut cloud servers in April 2022 and security fixes ceased after firmware 1016 (June 2018, per official release notes); post-2022 minor maintenance builds under new ownership are not security maintenance, so ongoing security updatability is Rare for the assessed firmware line.
Category Score Score: 2 / 3

2. System Security

Criterion Value Proof Comment
Authentication with other systems Partial [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-14447 πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; remote control runs over PubNub with a per-device channel/auth key and a local HTTP server, but there is no full local account-authentication boundary; most Talos bugs require an authenticated PubNub request while one DoS (CVE-2017-16348) does not, hence Partial.
Communications No encryption [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-5251 πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; CVE-2017-5251 states radio transmissions between the hub and connected Insteon devices are not encrypted on firmware 1012 and prior; Talos also documents firmware retrieval over plain HTTP (CVE-2018-3833/3834), so Not encrypted.
Storage No encryption [blog.talosintelligence.com/multiple-vuln-insteon/ πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; cited sources document an unsigned MPFS/firmware upload path (TALOS-2018-0511, CVE-2018-3832) and no documented encrypted-at-rest local storage; assessment limited to firmware 1012/1013, no device testing performed.
Category Score Score: 3 / 3

3. User Authentication

Criterion Value Proof Comment
Account management Absent [support.insteon.com/support-knowledgebase/insteon-hub2-release-notes πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; the hub exposes no local user-account management; identity depended on the now-defunct Insteon cloud account and shared PubNub keys, so account management on-device is Absent.
Authentication Basic [talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0496 πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; access relies on a shared PubNub channel/auth key rather than individual user credentials; Talos notes an authenticated PubNub request is required for most code-execution bugs, so Basic rather than Absent for the assessed firmware.
Brute-force protection Absent [blog.talosintelligence.com/multiple-vuln-insteon/ πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; no lockout, throttling, or brute-force protection on the PubNub/HTTP surface is documented in cited advisories; Absent on the cited evidence only.
Event logging Absent [talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0496 πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; cited Talos/Rapid7 sources document no on-device access-event log; Absent where no logging evidence was found, without device testing.
Passwords Default/Common/Easy to guess [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-5251 πŸ”— Proof] documentary assessment, NOT device testing; there is no user-set device password; the system uses embedded shared PubNub keys and the unencrypted radio link documented in CVE-2017-5251, matching the Default/common/easy-to-guess category for the assessed firmware.
Category Score Score: 3 / 3

Technical Specifications

Property Details
Operating System & App Proprietary embedded firmware on Microchip PIC32MX (MIPS32) (Companion App: )
Hardware (CPU / GPU) CPU: • GPU:
Memory & Storage Memory: • Storage:
Power, Battery & Charging Battery: • Power: • Charging:
Display & Camera Display: • Camera:
Sound & Connectivity Sound: • Connectivity:
Physical (Dimensions & Mass) Dimensions: • Mass: