Insteon Hub 2245-222 (Firmware 1012)
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| Insteon Hub 2245-222 (Firmware 1012) | ||
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Security Grade
Calculator v1
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Insteon Hub 2245-222 (Firmware 1012)
Brand: Insteon (SmartLabs/Insteon) Category: Smart Home Hub / Gateway • Model / Gen: 2245-222 (Hub 2), assessed on firmware 1012 Release Date: 2015-05-01 • Status: EOL Classification Date: 2026-10-23 • [support.insteon.com/support-knowledgebase/insteon-hub2-release-notes Official Website] | |
Contents
Security Evaluation
1. Device Security
| Criterion | Value | Proof | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Known hardware tampering | None | [talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0496 π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; the cited Talos advisories describe software/PubNub vulnerabilities and do not document a known, published hardware-tampering (teardown/jtag/debug-pad) exposure for this hub, so None is assigned on the cited firmware 1012/1013 evidence only. |
| Known vulnerabilities | Very common | [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-14447 π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; Cisco Talos disclosed twelve+ vulnerabilities on firmware 1012 (stack/global buffer overflows leading to RCE, information leak, DoS; CVE-2017-14447 and CVE ranges CVE-2017-16252 through CVE-2017-16347), plus Rapid7 CVE-2017-5251 for unencrypted hub-to-device radio; assessment limited to firmware 1012/1013 as tested by Talos. |
| Prior attacks | Rare | [blog.talosintelligence.com/multiple-vuln-insteon/ π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; public proof-of-concept code and technical disclosures exist (Talos PoC curl request, Rapid7 writeup), but no documented mass in-the-wild compromise campaign was found, so Rare rather than Very common. |
| Updatability | Rare | [www.reviewgeek.com/115308/insteon-may-have-joined-the-list-of-failed-smart-home-companies/ π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; the original vendor shut cloud servers in April 2022 and security fixes ceased after firmware 1016 (June 2018, per official release notes); post-2022 minor maintenance builds under new ownership are not security maintenance, so ongoing security updatability is Rare for the assessed firmware line. |
| Category Score | Score: 2 / 3 | ||
2. System Security
| Criterion | Value | Proof | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication with other systems | Partial | [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-14447 π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; remote control runs over PubNub with a per-device channel/auth key and a local HTTP server, but there is no full local account-authentication boundary; most Talos bugs require an authenticated PubNub request while one DoS (CVE-2017-16348) does not, hence Partial. |
| Communications | No encryption | [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-5251 π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; CVE-2017-5251 states radio transmissions between the hub and connected Insteon devices are not encrypted on firmware 1012 and prior; Talos also documents firmware retrieval over plain HTTP (CVE-2018-3833/3834), so Not encrypted. |
| Storage | No encryption | [blog.talosintelligence.com/multiple-vuln-insteon/ π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; cited sources document an unsigned MPFS/firmware upload path (TALOS-2018-0511, CVE-2018-3832) and no documented encrypted-at-rest local storage; assessment limited to firmware 1012/1013, no device testing performed. |
| Category Score | Score: 3 / 3 | ||
3. User Authentication
| Criterion | Value | Proof | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Account management | Absent | [support.insteon.com/support-knowledgebase/insteon-hub2-release-notes π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; the hub exposes no local user-account management; identity depended on the now-defunct Insteon cloud account and shared PubNub keys, so account management on-device is Absent. |
| Authentication | Basic | [talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0496 π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; access relies on a shared PubNub channel/auth key rather than individual user credentials; Talos notes an authenticated PubNub request is required for most code-execution bugs, so Basic rather than Absent for the assessed firmware. |
| Brute-force protection | Absent | [blog.talosintelligence.com/multiple-vuln-insteon/ π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; no lockout, throttling, or brute-force protection on the PubNub/HTTP surface is documented in cited advisories; Absent on the cited evidence only. |
| Event logging | Absent | [talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0496 π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; cited Talos/Rapid7 sources document no on-device access-event log; Absent where no logging evidence was found, without device testing. |
| Passwords | Default/Common/Easy to guess | [www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-5251 π Proof] | documentary assessment, NOT device testing; there is no user-set device password; the system uses embedded shared PubNub keys and the unencrypted radio link documented in CVE-2017-5251, matching the Default/common/easy-to-guess category for the assessed firmware. |
| Category Score | Score: 3 / 3 | ||
Technical Specifications
| Property | Details |
|---|---|
| Operating System & App | Proprietary embedded firmware on Microchip PIC32MX (MIPS32) (Companion App: ) |
| Hardware (CPU / GPU) | CPU: • GPU: |
| Memory & Storage | Memory: • Storage: |
| Power, Battery & Charging | Battery: • Power: • Charging: |
| Display & Camera | Display: • Camera: |
| Sound & Connectivity | Sound: • Connectivity: |
| Physical (Dimensions & Mass) | Dimensions: • Mass: |