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Documentation-based security assessment: Ring Video Doorbell (2nd Generation, 2020 release). Reviewed 2026-10-24. Documentation-based assessment of a defined Ring Video Doorbell (2nd Gen, 2020) profile. The doorbell is paired through the Ring app to a user Ring/Amazon account; first setup requires creating that account and its password, and Ring has required Two-Step Verification for all account sign-ins since February 2020. Device-to-cloud communication uses TLS and SRTP, and videos are encrypted in transit and at rest with AES; opt-in End-to-End Encryption is available but is not declared as enabled in this profile. The doorbell runs on a built-in rechargeable battery (optionally hardwired 8-24 VAC) and connects over 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi. Firmware updates are delivered automatically over the air. These are the explicitly selected conditions of this document assessment, not a claim about factory defaults or an inspected physical unit. Ratings map documented capabilities and the stated configuration to WikiIoT choices. Rare is a qualitative assessment of documented bounded exposure/history, not a measured frequency. Prior attacks is explicitly platform/account-level history: the widely reported Ring account takeovers and the 2023 FTC settlement concern the Ring account layer (reused passwords and weak protections), not a device-firmware exploit on this 2020 model, and this assessment does not identify the unit as a confirmed victim. An encrypted device-to-cloud path is rated Full for communications. Internal flash storage encryption is not documented, so local storage is rated Partial. Optional capabilities (such as E2EE) are not treated as enabled unless the assessment configuration states so. Historical CVEs do not imply that current firmware remains vulnerable. Release-date scope: 2020, as stated on the official Ring support page ("released 2020"); a more precise day is not published by Ring and is not asserted here. Historical vulnerability: CVE-2015-440, affecting legacy Ring (formerly DoorBot) video doorbells where pressing the set-up button and using the GainSpan Wi-Fi module API allowed remote attackers to obtain wireless-network configuration details. This CVE concerns pre-2020 legacy hardware and is cited as platform history; it does not identify the 2020 second-generation model as affected, and current patched firmware is assumed not to carry it. No physical device was tested. Keep the configuration and evidence scope with the ratings. References: [https://ring.com/support/products/doorbells/video-doorbell-gen-2 Ring Video Doorbell (2nd Gen) support page] [https://assets.ctfassets.net/a3peezndovsu/5ihit68yvJLf0IJ2dOHfuO/b9063f50382bbf3e143173bbf49e9781/Ring_Encryption_Whitepaper_2021-07-13.pdf Ring End-to-End Encryption whitepaper, 2021-07-13 (PDF)] [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2015-4400 NVD CVE-2015-440 — Ring/DoorBot doorbell Wi-Fi config exposure] [https://search.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/ftc-says-ring-employees-illegally-surveilled-customers-failed-stop-hackers-taking-control-users FTC press release — Ring settlement, 2023-05-31] [https://nz.ring.com/de/de/privacy Ring privacy — encryption of recordings in transit and at rest] [https://fehmijaafar.net/wiki-iot/index.php/Methodology WikiIoT methodology]
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