Shelly 1PM (SHELLY1PM)

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Shelly 1PM (SHELLY1PM)
Security Grade
   
     C
   
Calculator v1
Shelly 1PM
   Brand: Shelly (Parent: Allterco Robotics)
   Category: Smart switch • Model / Gen: Generation 1 SHSW-PM
   Release Date: 2017-01-01 • Status: End of sale
   Classification Date: 2026-10-24 • Official Website

Security Evaluation

1. Device Security

Criterion Value Proof Comment
Known hardware tampering Rare πŸ”— Proof In-wall / DIN-rail installation limits casual physical access; PCB and terminals remain reachable once the enclosure is opened.
Known vulnerabilities Rare πŸ”— Proof CVE-2025-11243 is documented on the Shelly Pro 4PM line; the 1PM is not listed among affected products.
Prior attacks None πŸ”— Proof No public report of botnet recruitment or mass exploitation targeting Shelly relays.
Updatability Very common πŸ”— Proof Vendor shipped firmware 1.6.0 to remediate CVE-2025-11243, showing an active OTA update process
Category Score Score: 2 / 3

2. System Security

Criterion Value Proof Comment
Authentication with other systems Partial πŸ”— Proof Local HTTP / WebSocket / MQTT RPC interfaces are exposed; credential protection must be enabled by the user and is off by default.
Communications Encrypted with up-to-date encryption πŸ”— Proof Cloud and MQTT traffic use TLS; the local HTTP endpoint on port 80 remains unencrypted.
Storage Encrypted with obselete encryption πŸ”— Proof No vendor documentation of encryption at rest for configuration and Wi-Fi credentials stored in flash.
Category Score Score: 2 / 3

3. User Authentication

Criterion Value Proof Comment
Account management Basic πŸ”— Proof Shelly Cloud account with limited role separation.
Authentication Basic πŸ”— Proof Local web UI credentials must be activated manually by the user.
Brute-force protection Absent πŸ”— Proof CVE-2025-11243 is pre-authentication: the crash is triggered during parsing, before authentication and ACL checks, so no lockout applies.
Event logging Partial logging πŸ”— Proof Only limited activity history is available in the app.
Passwords Require change after setup πŸ”— Proof Credentials set at commissioning, without documented complexity enforcement.
Category Score Score: 3 / 3

Technical Specifications

Property Details
Operating System & App Embedded firmware (ESP8266) (Companion App: Shelly Smart Control)
Hardware (CPU / GPU) CPU: ESP8266 • GPU:
Memory & Storage Memory: ~50 KB SRAM • Storage: 2 MB Flash
Power, Battery & Charging Battery: • Power: 110–240 VAC / 24–60 VDC, <1 W • Charging:
Display & Camera Display: • Camera:
Sound & Connectivity Sound: • Connectivity: Wi-Fi 802.11 b/g/n (2.4 GHz), MQTT, CoAP
Physical (Dimensions & Mass) Dimensions: 36 Γ— 41 Γ— 17 mm • Mass: N/A


Overall assessment: The Shelly 1PM is a competent Gen1 Wi-Fi relay with active OTA support and TLS-protected cloud/MQTT channels. Its main weaknesses are opt-in local authentication (off by default), no brute-force lockout, unencrypted local HTTP, and no documented encryption at rest for Wi-Fi credentials. Known CVE-2025-11243 affects the Shelly Pro line, not this model, but it demonstrates weaknesses in the shared local API design.