Apple iPad 9th Generation (A2602)

Apple iPad 9th Generation (A2602)
Security Grade B Calculator v	Apple iPad (9th generation) Brand: Apple (Parent: Apple Inc.) Category: Tablet • Model / Gen: 9th generation A2602 (Wi-Fi) Release Date: 2021-09-24 • Status: Classification Date: • Official Website

Security Evaluation

1. Device Security

Criterion	Value	Proof	Comment
Known hardware tampering	Rare	🔗 Proof	Assessor judgement under the physical-port definition: CVE-2025-24200 allowed physical-access bypass of USB Restricted Mode on vulnerable locked devices. The advisory includes iPad 7th generation and later, including this model. Rare is qualitative, not measured prevalence; this is a software-mediated physical attack, not modified silicon.
Known vulnerabilities	Very common	[1] [2] 🔗 Proof	Historical device-type assessment. CVE-2023-42824 and CVE-2025-24200 affect vulnerable iPadOS builds in model lists that include iPad 9; the respective fixes are 17.0.3 (2023-10-04) and 18.3.1 (2025-02-10). Very common is a provisional qualitative judgement about recurring platform disclosures, not a frequency measured from these two examples, an infection rate, or a finding that a patched A2602 remains vulnerable. The rubric supplies no numeric frequency threshold.
Prior attacks	Rare	🔗 Proof	Platform-level historical evidence only: the iPadOS 18.3.1 advisory reports possible exploitation of CVE-2025-24200 against selected targets, but gives neither an A2602 victim nor a population denominator. Rare remains a provisional qualitative mapping; the advisory establishes reported targeted exploitation, not how often A2602 devices were attacked or used in IoT botnets. Exact-model attack frequency is unverified; absence of a named victim does not establish None.
Updatability	Very common	🔗 Proof	Apple repeatedly supplies compatible signed iPadOS security updates; the reviewed release list includes iPad 9 for iPadOS 27.0.1 on 2026-09-28. Availability does not establish installation.
Category Score	Score: 2 / 3

2. System Security

Criterion	Value	Proof	Comment
Authentication with other systems	Partial	🔗 Proof	Protected host services use approved pairing and exchanged keys. This general-purpose platform does not require mutual authentication for every possible public website or third-party connection; Partial is scoped to that broader capability.
Communications	Encrypted with up-to-date encryption	[3] [4] 🔗 Proof	Score 1 is limited to supported protected communications under the stated personal-use baseline. iPadOS supports TLS 1.2/1.3; ATS normally requires TLS 1.2 or later for covered URL Loading System connections. Developers can configure exceptions, and lower-level networking is outside ATS coverage. This is documented capability/default-policy evidence, not a packet capture or assurance that every app, local-network path, or website uses encryption. An all-traffic interpretation remains unverified.
Storage	Encrypted with up-to-date encryption	🔗 Proof	Hardware-backed per-file Data Protection protects user flash data. Apple documents AES-128-XTS for A9-A13 devices, including A13 here; do not substitute the AES-256-XTS specification of newer chips. Protection depends on file class and passcode/lock state.
Category Score	Score: 2 / 3

3. User Authentication

Criterion	Value	Proof	Comment
Account management	Basic	[5] 🔗 Proof	Personal-use baseline: owner credentials and settings are manageable; separate lower-privilege local users are not assumed. Shared iPad is a distinct managed deployment and is excluded from this baseline.
Authentication	Secure	[6] 🔗 Proof	Touch ID plus a configured device passcode protect local access; platform secure boot verifies trusted system software. Secure describes supported controls, not immunity to vulnerabilities.
Brute-force protection	Exist	🔗 Proof	Secure Enclave enforces escalating delays after failed passcode attempts. Optional erasure after ten failures is not assumed enabled.
Event logging	Partial logging	🔗 Proof	When enabled, App Privacy Report records selected app data/sensor access and contacted domains for seven days. It is not a complete record of every device unlock or login.
Passwords	Require change after setup	[7] 🔗 Proof	The assessed credential is the local device passcode, not the Apple Account password. Apple documents user creation of a six-digit code, alternatives including four-digit/custom codes, and an option to turn the passcode off. The selected score 2 is an explicit approximation for a user-created credential under the configured-passcode baseline. It does not establish mandatory change after setup or universal complexity enforcement. None of the three fixed password labels exactly describes this behavior; literal rubric compliance remains unresolved.
Category Score	Score: 2 / 3

Technical Specifications

Property	Details
Operating System & App	iPadOS; launched with iPadOS 15; individual installed version not inspected. (Companion App: Not required for standalone operation)
Hardware (CPU / GPU)	CPU: Apple A13 Bionic • GPU:
Memory & Storage	Memory: • Storage: 64 GB or 256 GB
Power, Battery & Charging	Battery: Built-in 32.4 Wh rechargeable lithium-polymer battery • Power: 20 W USB-C power adapter included • Charging: Lightning, using Lightning to USB-C cable
Display & Camera	Display: 10.2-inch Retina IPS; 2160 x 1620; True Tone • Camera: 8 MP rear Wide; 12 MP front Ultra Wide with Center Stage
Sound & Connectivity	Sound: Stereo speakers; dual microphones; 3.5 mm headphone jack • Connectivity: Wi-Fi 5 (802.11ac, 2x2 MIMO); Bluetooth 4.2; Lightning; Smart Connector. A2602 has no cellular modem.
Physical (Dimensions & Mass)	Dimensions: 250.6 x 174.1 x 7.5 mm • Mass: 487 g (Wi-Fi model)

Assessment scope and limitations

Evidence rechecked on 2026-10-24. Model A2602 is the Wi-Fi iPad (9th generation). This is a literature-based coursework assessment, not a test of a particular unit. Baseline: personal use with Touch ID and a passcode configured; Shared iPad and MDM policies are excluded. Historical issues do not prove current exposure.

Rare and Very common are qualitative assessor judgements because the rubric provides no numeric thresholds. Prior attacks is conditional on platform-level interpretation: no A2602-specific incident was established. The password option is an imperfect mapping, not proof of mandatory post-setup password change. A strict model-only or literal-password interpretation requires marker review; the displayed grade is conditional.

Historical vulnerability examples

• CVE-2023-42824: a local attacker with a foothold could gain privileges on a vulnerable build. Fixed in iPadOS 17.0.3, released 2023-10-04. Apple lists iPad 6th generation and later. Reports about older iOS exploitation do not identify A2602 victims. Apple security advisory
• CVE-2025-24200: a physical attacker could bypass USB Restricted Mode on a locked vulnerable device; fixed in iPadOS 18.3.1, released 2025-02-10. Apple includes iPad 7th generation and later. This is historical patched exposure, not a claim that current firmware remains vulnerable. Apple security advisory

Review decisions (2026-10-24)

• Known vulnerabilities: model applicability and historical fix versions are verified from Apple advisories. Very common (3) is retained provisionally; two examples do not establish a quantitative disclosure frequency. The website methodology has no numeric Rare/Very common boundary.
• Prior attacks: retain Rare (2) only under a platform-history interpretation. Apple reports possible targeted exploitation but does not identify an A2602 victim, incident count, or botnet participation. Exact-model attack frequency is unknown.
• Communications: retain score 1 for documented protected TLS/ATS paths, with explicit application-exception and lower-level-networking limits. This does not establish encryption of all traffic. Apple ATS scope Apple ATS exceptions
• Passwords: retain score 2 as a declared approximation for a user-created local passcode. The fixed label Require change after setup is not a proven device requirement; score 1 complexity enforcement and score 3 default/common credentials are not established for this baseline either. Apple passcode settings

These decisions distinguish verified capabilities from assessor mapping. They do not settle the scoring policy for the other nine products. A final unconditional grade needs an agreed frequency threshold, attack scope, communication scope and treatment of user-created credentials. No individual device, installed OS, app exceptions or passcode policy was inspected.

Product evidence and scoring

A2602 identification: Apple model guide. Parameters: Apple specifications. First retail availability on 2021-09-24: Apple launch announcement. Current retail status is not asserted. RAM capacity and GPU core count are not specified in the reviewed Apple model specifications and remain unfilled; this is an evidence limitation, not a claim that the hardware is absent. The published dimensions, Wi-Fi-model mass, A13 chip, storage capacities, battery, charging, cameras and connectivity were rechecked against that specification.

Conditional calculation using the displayed interpretations: Device = ceil((2+3+2+1)/4)=2; System = ceil((2+1+1)/3)=2; User Authentication = ceil((2+1+1+2+2)/5)=2. Total 6 = B. This is the website device-risk rating, not coursework or bonus marks. Methodology