| Philips Hue Bridge (2nd Gen, BSB002)
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Security Grade
Calculator v1
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Philips Hue Bridge 2nd Generation
Release Date: 2015-10-01 • Status: End of sale
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Security Evaluation
1. Device Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Known hardware tampering
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Rare
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🔗 Proof
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CVE-2020-6007 is a Zigbee-stack heap overflow reachable over the air, not a physical-tampering case; no documented mass hardware tampering for the BSB002.
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| Known vulnerabilities
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Very common
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🔗 Proof
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Zigbee worm-style heap overflow (CVE-2020-6007), missing transport encryption in the local API (CVE-2017-14797) and a further 2026 cluster of HomeKit/Zigbee stack overflows and pairing bypasses affect the Bridge family.
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| Prior attacks
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Rare
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🔗 Proof
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The Bridge is not listed in CISA KEV; CVE-2020-6007 was demonstrated by researchers as a self-spreading Zigbee attack rather than an observed campaign.
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| Updatability
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Very common
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🔗 Proof
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Automatic firmware updates through the Hue app; Signify states a defined support period of at least 36 months from purchase.
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| Category Score
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Score: 2 / 3
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2. System Security
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Authentication with other systems
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Full
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🔗 Proof
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Bridge brokers authenticated pairing with Apple Home, Alexa, Google Home, SmartThings and Matter, with per-integration key exchange.
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| Communications
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Encrypted with up-to-date encryption
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🔗 Proof
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Cloud and app traffic use TLS with certificate pinning in the Hue app, and local API v2 is HTTPS-only; the plaintext-API flaw in CVE-2017-14797 was fixed in later firmware.
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| Storage
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Encrypted with up-to-date encryption
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🔗 Proof
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Zigbee network and link keys are stored in protected onboard flash and never exposed through the API; no user data is stored in the clear.
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| Category Score
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Score: 1 / 3
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3. User Authentication
| Criterion
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Value
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Proof
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Comment
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| Account management
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Full
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🔗 Proof
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Hue account manages homes, members, remote access and per-app API keys, with the physical link button gating new pairings.
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| Authentication
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Basic
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🔗 Proof
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Password plus e-mail verification for the account and physical-button pairing for local admins; no enforced MFA for the Hue account.
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| Brute-force protection
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Basic
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🔗 Proof
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Cloud login is rate limited, but the local API relies on the pairing button rather than a lockout policy for repeated token attempts.
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| Event logging
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Partial logging
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🔗 Proof
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The app lists connected apps and recent activity, but there is no detailed authentication audit log for the owner.
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| Passwords
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Require change after setup with complexity requirements
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🔗 Proof
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Hue account passwords must meet Signify's complexity policy; there is no factory-default device password to leave unchanged.
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| Category Score
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Score: 2 / 3
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Technical Specifications
| Property
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Details
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| Operating System & App
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Hue Bridge firmware (embedded Linux) (Companion App: Philips Hue app (Android/iOS))
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| Hardware (CPU / GPU)
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CPU: • GPU:
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| Memory & Storage
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Memory: • Storage: Onboard flash for keys, scenes and schedules
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| Power, Battery & Charging
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Battery: • Power: 5 V DC 600 mA adapter • Charging:
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| Display & Camera
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Display: • Camera:
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| Sound & Connectivity
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Sound: • Connectivity: Ethernet RJ-45, Zigbee (IEEE 802.15.4), Bluetooth (newer firmware)
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| Physical (Dimensions & Mass)
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Dimensions: • Mass:
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Reasoning: The BSB002 is one of the better-architected consumer hubs: no default credentials, physical-button pairing, pinned TLS to the cloud, per-integration keys and a published support period. It still accumulates CVEs because its Zigbee and HomeKit stacks are large attack surfaces, and the local API historically lacked transport encryption. Scope note: rated for a current firmware build with the Bridge on Ethernet; older firmware before the API hardening and the 2026 stack fixes would score lower. The model has been superseded by the Bridge Pro and is assessed as end of sale.
